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Abstract We analyse rural household livelihood and child school enrolment 
 decisions in the post-conflict setting of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of 
Bangladesh. What makes this paper innovative is the use of current subjective per-
ceptions regarding the possibility of violence in the future and past actual experi-
ences of violence in explaining household economic decision-making. Preferences 
are endogenous in line with behavioural economics. Regression results show that 
heightened subjective perceptions of future violence and past actual experiences 
of conflict influence current consumption and child enrolment and could encour-
age risky mixed crop cultivation. The trauma emanating from past experiences 
combined with current high perceptions of risk of violence may induce bolder 
and riskier behaviour in line with prospect theories of risk. Furthermore, a post-
conflict household-level Phoenix or economic revival factor may be in operation, 
based partially on greater within-group trust.
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8.1  Introduction
The object of this paper is to analyse rural household livelihood decisions, includ-
ing educational investment for future generations, in the post-conflict setting of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of Bangladesh. This is a region in the south-
eastern part of the country where a low-level insurgency took place between 1976 
and 1997, officially terminating after a peace accord in December, 1997.1 The 
armed struggle was between the state’s security forces, mainly the Bangladesh 
army, and the ethnically distinct local population (indigenous), in an otherwise 
fairly homogenous nation in terms of language and religion. The insurgency was 
aimed at regional autonomy rather than independence, but the principal local 
grievance was against officially sponsored land encroachment and grabbing by 
outsiders (Bengali population) who posed a threat to not only local livelihoods but 
also a distinct local way of life; see Chakma (2006) and Roy (2000). This hap-
pened in the land-hungry context of the world’s most densely populated country, 
which is also a low-income developing country where agriculture continues to be 
the main source of the population’s livelihood. Thus, while neo-Malthusian factors 
may be at work, land hunger is principally caused by poverty and the paucity of 
alternative livelihoods to agriculture. Population growth adds to land scarcity, 
exacerbated by environmental degradation, fuelling conflict over land and environ-
mental resources (Homer-Dixon 1999), as is the case in the CHT between the 
indigenous population and settler Bengalis.
There is now a substantial literature on the causes of large-scale internal con-
flict in the rational choice tradition. These explanations tend to centre on either the 
grievance hypothesis (mainly linked to inequalities between distinct groups deline-
ated by ethnicity, religion, or some other marker) or the greed motivation (reflect-
ing competition over capturable rents); see Murshed (2010, Chap. 3) for a review. 
A great deal of empirical work has also been conducted to test the empirical valid-
ity of these allegedly competing theories. The results are inconclusive, mainly due 
to data paucity on inter-group inequality (also known as horizontal inequality). 
Be that as it may, there is a consensus that violent internal conflict serves to per-
petuate poverty in developing countries, and equally, poverty increases the risk of 
violent conflict breaking out. This is referred to as the conflict-poverty trap; see 
Collier (2007).
Many of the quantitative studies on civil war are cross-country in nature, 
where the experiences of civil war in different and far-flung countries are lumped 
together in one single statistical (econometric) exercise. One can, therefore, be 
sceptical about the results of such regression analyses, as the various conflicts 
under scrutiny are not necessarily drawn from a homogenous population. There 
1
 The conflict in the CHT of Bangladesh is coded as a minor armed conflict, according to the 
PRIO-Uppsala methodology; see http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-
PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/ (accessed November 05, 2010).
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is also a need to conduct more systematic quantitative studies of the drivers and 
consequences of conflict at a more local level within nation states, a research area 
that is still relatively neglected.
Armed conflict may have far-reaching consequences for rural livelihood strate-
gies, including investment decisions and cropping patterns. This may contribute to 
an analysis of poverty as well as development in general, particularly rural devel-
opment. Lacunae associated with localised conflict become even more acute when 
it comes to the economic analyses of the short- and long-term impacts of conflict 
on households’ decision-making. The first innovation of this paper is that it is able 
to make a contribution in this connection based on a unique data set compiled 
during a socio-economic survey of households in this area in 2008 (Barkat et al. 
2009).
The rural farming household is no stranger to risky outlays, as returns to crop-
ping or animal husbandry are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. We will 
utilise the livelihood framework to explain household decisions under uncertainty. 
This approach acknowledges an inherent inseparability between production and con-
sumption decisions for rural households (Bardhan and Udry 1999, Chap. 2), which 
affects labour allocation between farm and off-farm (including education) activities, 
as well as cropping (and animal husbandry activities) for own consumption and the 
market.
The nature of these risks and uncertainties can be altered by armed conflict of 
a sufficiently long duration. This affects the livelihood and investment  decisions 
of households. We will relate our findings to prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) to explain greater risk-taking behaviour following the traumas 
of war, where a strong desire to retrieve a valued past state may help explain 
increased risk-taking. This is the second innovation of the paper. Additionally, 
the survey employed in the paper contains information about subjective percep-
tions regarding the future prospects of violence after the conflict ended as well as 
past actual experiences of violence, both of which impact household economic 
decision-making. Thus, we are dealing with preferences that are endogenous to 
not only economic, political and social institutions (Bowles 1998; Fehr and Hoff 
2011) but also personal histories of trauma and expectations of future conflict. 
Along with standard socioeconomic characteristics, our household survey data 
contain both subjective (psychological) information regarding trust, current per-
ceptions about the risk of future conflict and objective data on past conflict experi-
ence. We relate these to observed livelihood decision-making. This is in line with 
contemporary behavioural economics as well as earlier thinking (for instance, 
Boulding 1956), about individual self-image and the effect of various stimuli in 
framing one’s image.
Our analysis is conducted in the post-accord era, a decade after the peace 
treaty which allegedly ended the war. An important policy consideration in post-
conflict societies is the resumption of economic activity and growth. On the one 
hand, post-conflict growth can be lopsided, favouring infrastructure reconstruction 
over agriculture or manufacturing, due to wartime collateral damage as well as the 
perceived riskiness of investment in productive sectors which take a long time to 
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yield dividends (Addison and Murshed 2005). On the other hand, other authors 
 emphasise a more general ‘Phoenix’ factor (Koubi 2005). In other words, rapid 
economic growth (in the macroeconomic sense) follows the cessation of intense 
and prolonged conflict, resembling the fable of the Phoenix rising from the ashes. 
There can, however, be differences across various economic sectors. Our third 
innovation is that we examine whether there can be such a local Phoenix factor 
given the impact of subjective perceptions on household cropping decisions.
8.2  The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh
Bangladesh is in the Ganges delta and is one of the most densely (1,229/km2) 
populated countries in the world where the amount of per capita arable land was 
only 0.1 ha in 2007. It is a low-income developing country, where about 50 % 
of the population lives in poverty (using the international poverty line of below 
$1.25 per day; World Bank 2010). Over the last two decades, Bangladesh’s econ-
omy experienced growth rates of around 5.5 % per annum, but a large segment 
of employment still relates to traditional agriculture (World development indi-
cators, The World Bank, Washington DC http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG, Accessed 11 Jan 2011). This makes land the scarcest 
and most competed over resource in Bangladesh. Land issues have been seen to 
underpin a variety of Maoist uprisings in neighbouring India and Nepal, and the 
literature on these is copious; for example, Murshed and Gates (2005) find a sta-
tistically significant relationship between conflict intensity (district-wise fatalities) 
and landlessness in the context of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Few studies, 
however, have a similar methodology to the one in this paper based upon detailed 
household surveys, and household level responses to risk and uncertainty in a 
post-conflict setting.
Bangladesh is mostly ethnically homogenous, with the vast majority of the 
population being Bengali speaking and Muslim. There are a few distinct eth-
nicities that differ in both language and religion. These groups are mainly con-
centrated in the CHT region. This region is situated in the south-eastern part of 
the country and is covered with lush green hills, with a relatively larger propor-
tion of afforested areas. From a strategic point of view, CHT is important as it 
adjoins two Indian states (Tripura and Mizoram) and Myanmar. Insurgency in the 
Indian north-eastern states and Myanmar raises the military importance of this 
region (Roy 2000; Barkat et al. 2009; Mohsin 2003). The various ethnic groups 
in CHT are closer, in appearance and culture, to their neighbours in north-east-
ern India, Myanmar and Thailand, than to the rest of Bangladesh. Buddhism, 
Hinduism and Christianity are prevalent among these ethnicities. They have their 
own languages in both oral and written form. The indigenous peoples of CHT are 
often identified as Jumma people, derived from the word jum (swidden or slash 
and burn shifting cultivation). The proportion of the non-indigenous (Bengali 
speaking) population in CHT has been increasing over time. According to the 
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1991 population census of Bangladesh, indigenous groups constitute 51.4 % of 
the CHT total population of about one million (Mohsin 2003; Roy 2000). It is 
important to note that the indigenous inhabitants of CHT also exhibit a degree of 
diversity based on eleven different (tribal) identities.
Despite its lower population density compared to the rest of Bangladesh, the 
CHT region is actually land-scarce in terms of availability of land for cultivation 
(only 23 % of the land is arable). In 1974, the amount of per capita arable land 
was about 0.45 ha, which declined to about 0.24 ha in 1991. Most of the land is 
either uninhabitable due to its topography or its usage is restricted by law (reserve 
or protected forests). The land ownership patterns as well as types of land in CHT 
also differ from that of plain regions. Customary (common) ownership of land 
exists here, and at the same time, private property rights are recognised by the 
state, making ownership issues more complex (Roy 2000; Barkat et al. 2009).
The CHT region enjoyed an autonomous status until 1860 when the British 
took it over under their direct administration. The CHT regulation of 1900 put an 
embargo on ‘outsiders’ settling or purchasing land in the territory. This ‘excluded 
area’ status of CHT was replaced by a ‘tribal area’ classification in 1962.2 Due to 
the construction of an artificial reservoir by damming the River Karnafuli at 
Kaptai in the 1960s for the purposes of power generation, approximately 
1,036 km2 was submerged and 54,000 acres of highly prized arable land was lost 
in the river valleys. After the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, 
the indigenous people of CHT demanded recognition of their ethnic identity and 
regional autonomy in the constitution, which has not happened. Given the popula-
tion transfer policies of non-indigenous people into this region by successive 
Bangladesh governments, the demand for indigenous rights transformed into 
armed rebellion by different indigenous groups.
Successive Bangladeshi governments of both a military and democratic com-
plexion adopted mixed strategies of using military force to quell rebellion, 
while, at the same time, encouraging, or colluding with, a population transfer 
programme. In 1976, armed forces were deployed in CHT in a classic ‘Aid to 
Civil Power’ operation, which triggered tensions in the region. A few indigenous 
political groups [Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhiti Samiti (PCJSS)] engaged in 
an armed insurgency against the intrusion by the authorities. Under the counter-
insurgency strategy, demographic engineering interventions aimed at settling a 
large number of Bengali-speaking households in CHT were seen as enhancing the 
size of population loyal to the state, and these fresh settlements acted as a coun-
terweight to indigenous peoples’ demands for rights and regional autonomy. Due 
to the state-sponsored settlement programme, a considerable number of indig-
enous people were uprooted from their homesteads, further intensifying the armed 
2
 A well-known paper by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) relates colonial land tenure systems in India 
to agriculture productivity, demonstrating lower productivity in areas where landlordism pre-
vailed compared to regions where the state directly taxed the peasant farmer. In our case, the 
colonial period legacy is one of landlordism.
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struggle. About 54,000 indigenous people took refuge in the neighbouring Tripura 
state of India and another 50,000 became internally displaced persons.
In the post-cold war era, and after the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh, 
pressure for a political solution mounted. This led to an accord between the PCJSS 
and the Bangladesh Government on 2 December 1997, known as ‘The CHT 
accord 1997’. The accord was incomplete; the United Peoples Democratic Front 
(UPDF) continues the struggle for full autonomy (Mohsin 2003). Continuing land 
disputes, the non-restitution of land to indigenous peoples, the presence of the 
Bangladesh army, the poor rehabilitation of refugees and internally displaced per-
sons, and the non-implementation of a special status in the country’s constitution 
make the post-conflict situation of CHT fragile. Indigenous people living in this 
area continue experiencing various types of violence and face restrictions on their 
mobility (Barkat et al. 2009).
8.3  Data and Methodology
The ‘Socio-economic Baseline Survey of CHT’ is the source of our  quantitative 
data; see Barkat et al. (2009). The data were collected in 2008 from a cross 
section of households (both migrant Bengalis and indigenous people) living in 
CHT. The sample design of the survey captured the whole region of CHT, espe-
cially the ethnic diversity among the indigenous population. The representative 
sample is comprised of 3,238 households, where the number of indigenous and 
migrant Bengali households was 1,786 and 1,452, respectively. Although the 
main focus of the survey was collecting data on the socio-economic status of 
the CHT population, it also gathered information on peace-confidence build-
ing issues. In particular, what is noteworthy is that data on current post-conflict 
subjective perceptions about the degree of violence, and the chance of its occur-
ring in future, were collected from households for the year 2008. These pertain 
to their threat perceptions about the extent of armed conflict, the possibility of 
attacks from the other community, the fear of forcible eviction as well as other 
variables at the time of the survey. These variables amount to expectations about 
the future prospects of conflict.
In addition, data on households’ actual experience of violence, or their par-
ticipation in conflict, during the years of the insurgency (1976–1997) were also 
collected. These refer to past experiences of violence and were related to displace-
ment or eviction, loss of land and armed conflict, among others. Not surprisingly, 
there are missing observations, both at the level of perception and in the actual 
past experiences of conflict, as not all households were able to reveal this sensi-
tive information, not least because of the continued presence of the Bangladesh 
army in this area. Furthermore, we have data on the degree of trust (social capital) 
between the two communities, including between the different tribes that make up 
the indigenous segment of the population in CHT.
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8.3.1  Descriptive Statistics
Perceptual data on the threat of violence pertain to the year of the survey (2008). 
This allows the researcher to analyse the nexus between perceptions of violence 
and various livelihood decisions in a post-conflict setting. In Table 8.1, perceptions 
about the threat of violence relate to three variables: (i) perceptions about armed 
conflict, (ii) perceptions about communal violence occurring and (iii) the fear of 
eviction. In the survey, 14–16 % households perceived a threat of armed conflict, 
while a third (32–34 %) felt a danger of communal violence, and 37–38 % of 
households were apprehensive about possible eviction from their land.
Data on real-life experiences of conflict for the period of the insurgency (1976–
1997) were collected from households (with at least one family member experi-
encing violence) chiefly in the form of three broad categories: (i) displacement 
from home, (ii) dispossession of land (either farmland or homestead) and (iii) 
participation in and/or victim of armed conflict; see Table 8.1. Estimates indicate 
that 13–14 % of the households experienced displacement from their own home or 
land and 18–20 % were dispossessed of their farmland before the peace accord in 
1997. All in all, various types of armed conflict were experienced by 17–20 % of 
the households.
Additionally, some 91 % of indigenous households felt that their group rela-
tions were good, implying the presence of trust within the eleven different tribes 
which comprise the community. It has to be borne in mind that the indigenous 
peoples’ antagonists (settler Bengalis) are ethnically homogenous, and we would 
expect a high level of trust within that group. Only about 11 % of the responses 
pointed to good relations between the settler and indigenous communities.
Three household livelihood decisions—consumption expenditure, decisions with 
regard to children’s schooling and production (cropping) decisions—were ana-
lysed. Data on consumption incorporated a separate format for food and non-food 
expenditure (Table 8.1). We may regard the decision to enrol children in school as 
an investment (human capital accumulating) decision. Data on total number of chil-
dren enrolled in both primary and secondary school were analysed at the household 
level, within the age bracket of 6–18 years. Estimates show that 44 % children of 
the CHT were enrolled in schools. The type of crop produced is a proxy for produc-
tion decisions. Some 42–43 % of households produced only food crops, an insig-
nificantly small proportion of households produced only cash crops, and there were 
a good number of households (50–51 %) producing both cash and food crops.
8.3.2  Empirical Model Specification and Strategy
Our quantitative analysis primarily focuses on the relation between either the per-
ceived threat of violence after the peace accord or the past experience of conflict 
before the peace accord on various livelihood decision-making by households 
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living in the CHT.3 For consumption decisions, an OLS model was used. But for 
investment in children’s education and production (cropping) decisions, a logit or 
probit model was specified, as these two cases measure the probability or chance 
of an event occurring. We control for household demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics including those for children, type of school, facilities at the school 
and agricultural techniques.
3
 Full details of the estimations, as well as the descriptive statistics, can be found in Badiuzzaman 
et al. (2013).
Table 8.1  Descriptive statistics: conflict and livelihood
Variables Indigenous household Bengali household
Mean Standard  
deviation
Number of  
observations
Mean Standard  
deviation
Number of 
observations
Current perception of violence
Fear of armed  
conflict
0.16 0.3709 1,786 0.14 0.3498 1,367
Fear of communal 
violence
0.32 0.4680 1,786 0.34 0.4741 1,367
Fear of eviction  
from land
0.38 0.4847 1,786 0.37 0.4845 1,367
Previous experience of violence
Displacement 0.13 0.3320 1,786 0.14 0.3483 1,367
Land dispossession 0.18 0.3830 1,786 0.20 0.3988 1,367
Armed conflict 0.20 0.4016 1,786 0.17 0.3787 1,367
Social capital 0.91 0.2795 1,183 0.11 0.3160 881
Consumption decision
Per capita annual  
consumption  
expenditure (in Tk.)
11,857 4,331.67 1,786 11,862 4,731.07 1,452
Per capita annual  
food consumption  
expenditure (in Tk.)
11,095 4,152.20 1,786 11,113 4,535.11 1,452
Per capita annual  
non-food consump-
tion expenditure  
(in Tk.)
762 445.07 1,786 749 409.15 1,452
Investment decision
Child enrolment  
in primary and  
secondary school
0.44 0.4961 2,345 0.44 0.4965 1,625
Production decision: type of cropping
Only food crop 0.43 0.4952 1,206 0.42 0.4946 899
Only cash crop 0.07 0.2574 1,206 0.06 0.2397 899
Mixed crop (both 
food and cash)
0.50 0.5002 1,206 0.51 0.5001 899
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The standard regression equation followed in this paper is as follows:
where the dependent variable Yi refers to various livelihood decision-making vari-
ables, consisting of consumption expenditure (continuous variable in logarithmic 
form), child enrolment in either primary or secondary school (dummy variable), 
and type of crop produced (dummy variable) for household i measured at the sur-
vey. The explanatory variables are as follows: HSEij are household-level demo-
graphic and socio-economic variables, Cij is a set of child characteristics (age 
and sex), Hij describes household head characteristics (age, sex and education), 
Sij denotes schooling variables, SCij indicates social capital or trust, Vij stands for 
threat perceptions at the time of the survey, PVij indicates pre-peace accord experi-
ences of violence, and εi is a random error term.
Moreover, we use interaction variables for experiences of violence along with 
trust in three regression models. Trust (social capital) is not entered as a separate 
explanatory variable as current perceptions of violence approximate the converse 
of between-group (indigenous versus settler) social capital. Trust between the var-
ious (11) indigenous ethnicities is more relevant and constitutes a key factor in 
how the impact of previous experiences of violence has evolved into present-day 
decision-making and preferences. Hence, we only use trust as an interaction term 
with past conflict experience. For Bengalis, the social capital variable reflects trust 
between indigenous and Bengali peoples, while for the indigenous people, it is 
trust between the eleven indigenous tribal groups.
8.4  Results and Discussions
This section analyses the determinants of household consumption decisions, 
followed by two other important livelihood decisions—investment in children’s 
education and cropping (production) decisions—in relation to subjective per-
ceptions of varying degrees of the threat of violence, within indigenous group 
trust factors and pre-peace accord experiences of violence. We believe this to 
be a major innovation of our study because we attempt to gauge the impact of 
subjective perceptions on economic decision-making with regard to consump-
tion, output (cropping) and investment decisions after an uneasy peace accord 
that only imperfectly ended the conflict. Within the context we are studying, 
land dispossession is a key factor, and the continuing fear of intimidation with 
a view to further land alienation is likely to impact on indigenous households’ 
decision-making under uncertainty. To this end, and to sharpen our focus and 
analysis, we classify individual households’ fears of future violence into dif-
ferent variables: armed conflict, communal violence and fear of eviction from 
land.
(8.1)
Yi = α + β1HSEij + β2Hij + β3Cij + β4Sij + β5(Vij, PVij, SCij∗PVij)+ εi,
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8.4.1  Consumption Expenditure 
We endogenise preferences about consumption to past conflict experiences and 
expectations about future conflict. We do this separately for the indigenous peo-
ple and settler Bengalis (Table 8.2). Specification 1 relates to current perceptions 
about violence. Among these, the fear of armed conflict negatively and signifi-
cantly affects consumption, both food and non-food, for both indigenous and 
Bengali peoples. The fear of communal violence is less significant. It adversely 
effects non-food consumption for both communities. As far as the fear of eviction 
is concerned, it significantly raises consumption for Bengali settlers, but not for 
the indigenous inhabitants of CHT, although the signs are in a positive direction.
It may be argued that there are endogeneity issues between current perceptions 
of violence and consumption because households with greater economic capacity 
may feel more threatened. To get consistent coefficient estimates for consump-
tion expenditure regression, we attempted a two-stage least squares (2SLS) esti-
mation approach where at the first stage we require instrumental variables. There 
are a few variables in our data set that are potential candidates for instruments. 
For overall consumption and food consumption regressions, we used three varia-
bles: good relationship between Bengali and indigenous communities, perceptions 
about the oppressiveness of the security forces and previous land dispossession 
which are uncorrelated with consumption, but correlated with our three variables 
of interest under current perceptions of violence. For non-food consumption, we 
used three variables: satisfaction about inter-community interaction, attendance 
in the other group’s festivals and festivals celebrated jointly which are effective 
instruments. Results from 2SLS estimates found current perceptions of violence 
insignificant in determining overall consumption expenditure, and for food and 
non-food consumption separately. However, since alternative Hausman tests of 
exogeneity indicate no endogeneity between current perceptions of violence and 
consumption expenditure, when we compare OLS and 2SLS estimates, we can 
be confident about the reliability of our OLS estimates. Details may be found in 
Badiuzzaman et al.  (2013).
The regression results under specification 2 relate to past experiences of vio-
lence. Displacement discouraged consumption, but significantly only for Bengali 
settlers. Land dispossession encouraged non-food consumption significantly for 
both communities. Personal experiences of armed conflict (in the past) discourage 
consumption, but more strongly for Bengali settlers.
We also attempted to investigate the role of trust (social capital) in the form 
of good relations among the various indigenous communities on consumption 
(specification 3, in Table 8.2). Arguably, intra-group trust has an important role 
on livelihoods in post-conflict settings, especially for the indigenous inhabitants of 
the region. Accordingly, we interacted three variables on previous experiences of 
violence: displacement, land dispossession and actual experiences of armed con-
flict with current good relations among the indigenous communities (trust) as a 
proxy of social capital. Specification 3 indicates that among the three interaction 
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Table 8.2  Determinant of consumption expenditure: OLS estimation
Note Estimation controls for variables: household size, per capita asset, age of household head, 
sex of household head, educational status of household head, household electrification status, 
enrolment of children and log amount of cultivated land. Social capital is used as control variable 
in specification 2 only
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,** p < 0.05,* p < 0.1
Independent variable Dependent variable
All consumption 
expenditure
Food consumption 
expenditure
Non-food consump-
tion expenditure
Indigenous household
Specification 1: Current perception of violence
Fear of armed conflict −0.07*** (0.025) −0.07*** (0.026) −0.13*** (0.033)
Fear of communal 
violence
0.03 (0.025) 0.04 (0.026) −0.06* (0.034)
Fear of eviction from 
land
0.03 (0.026) 0.03 (0.027) 0.05 (0.03)
Specification 2: Previous experience of violence
Displacement −0.03 (0.037) −0.04 (0.034) 0.03 (0.039)
Land dispossession −0.03 (0.023) −0.04* (0.024) 0.06* (0.035)
Past armed conflict −0.005(0.022) 0.01 (0.023) −0.13*** (0.033)
Specification 3: Interaction of previous experience of violence and social capital
Displacement* trust −0.09 (0.096) −0.097 (0.0982) −0.035 (0.148)
Land dispossession* 
trust
0.10 (0.076) 0.092 (0.0780) 0.19** (0.143)
Past armed conflict* 
trust
0.11*** (0.084) 0.12*** (0.084) −0.10 (0.130)
Bengali household
Specification 1: Current perception of violence
Fear of armed conflict −0.16*** (0.040) −0.16*** (0.041) −0.135*** (0.0433)
Fear of communal 
violence
0.01 (0.033) 0.02 (0.034) −0.101** (0.0393)
Fear of eviction from 
land
0.07** (0.035) 0.07* (0.037) 0.07* (0.041)
Specification 2: Previous experience of violence
Displacement −0.08** (0.039) −0.087** (0.0412) −0.02 (0.045)
Land dispossession 0.04 (0.028) 0.040 (0.0289) 0.07*(0.039)
Past armed conflict −0.10*** (0.030) −0.09*** (0.031) −0.14***(0.039)
Specification 3: Interaction of previous experience of violence and social capital
Displacement* trust 0.09 (0.143) 0.10 (0.1558) −0.05 (0.1395)
Land dispossession* 
trust
0.06 (0.095) 0.05 (0.1012) 0.04 (0.1081)
Past armed conflict* 
trust
−0.06 (0.074) −0.07 (0.077) 0.10 (0.1146)
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variables, previous experience of armed conflict along with good relations among 
indigenous communities is highly statistically significant in increasing overall con-
sumption (Table 8.2). A similar positive effect for non-food consumption exists for 
indigenous communities when land dispossession is interacted with intra-group 
trust.
Greater trust appears to effect household preferences about consumption. 
Moreover, the past actual experience of conflict is salient in this regard. In line 
with the arguments of Fehr and Hoff (2011), social institutions impact on indi-
vidual preferences, implying that preferences are endogenous to social institutions 
and interactions. Conflict changes the nature of social interactions, local institu-
tions and the constraints (social rules) that individuals face. The previous expe-
rience of conflict when combined with trust between different indigenous tribes 
appears to encourage consumption within that group. On the other hand, when 
trust factors are not taken into account, greater saving and less consumption is 
induced when there are apprehensions about future conflict, as well as previous 
experiences of armed conflict among both communities. Future fears of eviction 
raise consumption (significantly for Bengalis).
8.4.2  School Enrolment
Decisions to enrol children in school can be a proxy of investment decisions for 
the future, and because children are potentially suppliers of household labour, it 
entails an opportunity cost.
Our probit regression results of specification 1 in Table 8.3 indicate that cur-
rent perceptions of violence fail to explain variations in the likelihood of children’s 
enrolment as the coefficients are statistically insignificant. Although their relation 
is insignificant, households from both communities perceiving a danger of evic-
tion have a greater chance of sending children to school compared to those house-
holds who do not have this perception, while apprehensions about armed conflict 
and communal violence recurring reduce the chance of child enrolment among the 
indigenous.
Past experiences of land dispossession have a deep-seated influence on cur-
rent livelihood decision-making processes, which is evident in specification 2 
in Table 8.3, particularly for the indigenous peoples. It shows that indigenous 
households having a previous experience of land dispossession have a higher 
probability of sending children to school as compared to those households who 
did not encounter this form of violence. The positive and statistically significant 
determining role of the experience of land dispossession is found robust across 
various estimation procedures (LPM, logit and probit). The experience of land 
dispossession is traumatic and creates long-standing vulnerabilities, as land is 
the most productive asset. This may raise the likelihood of sending their chil-
dren to school, possibly with a view to overcoming the challenge of earning 
livelihoods from an ever-decreasing amount of cultivable land. But the primary 
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‘investment’ motivation for schooling children is to allow future generations to 
acquire qualifications so that they may escape the conflict and are less dependent 
on agriculture.
8.4.3  Production Decisions: Cropping Patterns
Our regression results regarding determinants of cropping decisions are reported 
in Table 8.4.4 In the first specification, fear of communal violence has a positive 
and statistically significant role in raising the probability of mixed cropping (both 
food and cash crops) for both communities, which is statistically significant. There 
is a possible endogeneity between fear of communal violence and cropping deci-
sions because households producing mixed crops might be more apprehensive, as 
this requires more fertile land in terms of location and other factors, and land is 
central to the conflict. We have used a variable describing overall satisfaction in 
social interactions in the community as a whole as an instrument since it is related 
to fears of future communal violence and not correlated to mixed cropping deci-
sions. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of exogeneity show that there is no endogeneity 
problem, and it implies that the coefficient of the probit model is preferable to the 
IV probit. We also found our estimates robust across various models: LPM, logit 
and probit. The details can be found in Badiuzzaman et al. Cameron (2013).
4
 We do not have data on access to or distance from the market for each household in the survey, 
but because of the locations, the same distance from the market will apply to a large subsets of 
households surveyed.
Table 8.3  Determinants of child enrolment in school: probit estimation
Note Estimation controls for variables: age of child, age square of child, sex of child, household 
size, per capita asset, age of household head, sex of household head, educational status of house-
hold head, type of educational institutions, language of book and language of instruction. Social 
capital is used as control variable in specification 2 only
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Independent variables Dependent variable: school enrolment
Indigenous household Bengali 
household
Specification 1: Current perception of violence
Fear of armed conflict −0.01 (0.040) 0.01 (0.051)
Fear of communal violence −0.05 (0.035) 0.01 (0.042)
Fear of eviction from land 0.003 (0.034) 0.02 (0.042)
Specification 2: Previous experience of violence
Displacement from own home −0.05 (0.045) 0.05 (0.054)
Land dispossession 0.09**(0.038) 0.04 (0.042)
Past armed conflict −0.02 (0.034) 0.05 (0.046)
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As per specification 1 of the probit estimation (Table 8.4), both indigenous and 
Bengali households perceiving fear of communal violence are found more likely 
to produce mixed crop and the result is robust across the linear probability, logit 
and probit models. Probit results under specification 2 show that previous experi-
ences of armed conflict motivated Bengali households to engage in greater mixed 
cropping, and it is robust across linear probability and logit estimates. Earlier 
experiences of land dispossession lower the chances of mixed cropping among 
the indigenous population. The presence of trust (specification 3) significantly 
increases the probability of mixed cropping among the indigenous peoples when 
interacted with land dispossession and past armed conflict, but the same is found 
insignificant for Bengali settlers. A study on the conflict-affected parts of Northern 
Uganda by Rockmore (2012) suggests that conflict alters the composition of assets 
held towards less risky assets. Our findings are qualitatively similar to that of 
Nillesen and Verwimp (2010) for post-conflict rural Burundi, where the cultivation 
of cash crops also increased. In our case, the past experience of conflict and a fear 
of communal violence igniting in the future raise the probability of mixed crop 
production.
Our apparently anomalous results, with respect to rising risk-taking in cropping 
patterns following greater subjective feelings of violent experiences, can only be 
explained by less well-known theories about risky behaviour. Conventional wis-
dom would suggest that individuals become more risk averse after an adverse 
shock, such as conflict and the fear of violence. This is also the prediction of the 
expected utility theory in conjunction with the concavity property of standard 
Table 8.4  Determinant of cropping decisions (mixed crop): probit estimation
Note Estimation controls for variables: household size, per capita asset, age of household head, 
sex of household head, educational status of household head, amount of cultivated land and type 
of cultivation techniques (jum, plough and both). Social capital is used as control variable in 
specification 2 only
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Independent variables Dependent variable: mixed crop production
Indigenous household Bengali 
household
Specification 1: Current perception of violence
Fear of armed conflict −0.03 (0.057) 0.07 (0.074)
Fear of communal violence 0.14** (0.054) 0.16** (0.063)
Fear of eviction from own land 0. 00023 (0.056) 0.002 (0.068)
Specification 2: Previous experience of violence
Displacement from own home −0.06 (0.055) 0.04 (0.069)
Land dispossession −0.09* (0.048) −0.03 (0.056)
Past armed conflict 0.04 (0.049) 0.15** (0.062)
Specification 3: Interaction of previous experience of violence and social capital
Displacement* trust −0.12 (0.271) −0.64 (0.5647)
Land dispossession* trust 0.27* (0.132) −0.05 (0.4564)
Past armed conflict* trust 0.27* (0.147) 0.71 (0.5897)
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utility functions leading to the properties of diminishing marginal utility of 
income, as well as absolute risk aversion. The standard precepts of expected util-
ity do not, however, hold in many contexts. In our case, we can argue that both 
experience and subjective perceptions of violence amount to ‘trauma’, which has 
a pecuniary counterpart that may be characterised as one where the concerned 
individual or household has sustained a financial loss. Markowitz (1952) indicated 
that starting from a state of loss, individuals want to engage in more risk-taking 
to regain their previous valued position than when their wealth portfolio is exhib-
iting positive growth and their expectations are over-fulfilled. Second, he also 
pointed out that what may matter more for decisions to engage in risky projects is 
the distribution of the possible profit or loss it may entail rather than the absolute 
(expected) value of risky prospect. In other words, the direction of change in the 
household’s asset position and the possibility of regaining a highly valued asset in 
monetary or social terms are more salient than its level in our case.
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we may apply prospect theory to 
explain our empirical findings with regard to cropping patterns, bearing in mind 
that cash crop cultivation is more risky, as it does not guarantee the household’s 
subsistence and is more subject to market fluctuations. Prospect theory represents 
a departure from expected utility in that it is a two-stage process, and risky ven-
tures are weighted by not only (subjective) probability of the different risky states 
but also a more complicated ‘decision weighting’ process. The first stage of the 
decision involves an editing phase where a reference point is chosen to evaluate 
the likely effect of the actual risky investment framed in terms of specific aspects 
of the highly valued by the decision maker. This is akin to the framing decisions 
currently emphasised by behavioural economists and individual self-image stated 
much earlier by Boulding (1956). Following the trauma of eviction and/or vio-
lence, individuals may feel that the key value of assets has diminished and must be 
replaced as a priority. In the second stage of evaluation, when the household 
decides on its type of crop cultivation, it may take more risks, if the risky project 
has a high enough decision weight compared to the less risky alternative. Decision 
weighting is related to the probability of an uncertain project bearing fruition, but 
it also includes the subjective desirability of the outcome, a property that alters 
less readily in the mind than the pure probability of success. The point is that tak-
ing on more risks is understandable if there is a substantial chance that more risky 
investments will lead to recuperation of particular erstwhile losses. This may 
explain why households with a greater past experience of violence (and in some 
cases a fear of future conflict) are more likely to invest in the more risky cash 
crops along with food crops.5 Moreover, prospect theory also suggests that the 
5
 Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979), let the value (V) of the household’s risky prospect 
be V(x, y, p, L) = pi(p, L)v(x)+ [1− pi(p, L)]v(y) · · ·pi1,pi2 > 0. Here, v(x) is the value of the 
risky project, v(y) is the value of the less risky project, p refers to the probability of success of 
x, and π is the decision weight which is a positive function of both the probability of success 
and losses (L) previously sustained. It is immediately apparent that an increase in losses due to 
perceptions of violence will raise the attractiveness of the risky project by weighing the decision 
more heavily in favour of x.
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decision weight given to a desirable outcome may be greater than its objective 
probability in the expected utility framework. In other words, individuals over-
weight the likelihood of a more desirable outcome.
Our results also have qualitatively similarities to the findings of Voors et al. 
(2012) in their field experiment in post-conflict Burundi, which indicate greater 
risk-taking and trust after conflict. While we only have data on trust for the sur-
vey period and are unable to infer any increase in trust, social capital in the form 
of trust could have a possible role in determining livelihood decisions, especially 
when it comes to certain consumption and cropping decisions among the indig-
enous peoples of CHT. In our case, the application of prospect theory to individual 
decision-making by households appears more salient when it comes to crop-
ping decisions, especially among settler Bengali households, and seems better at 
explaining household risk-taking.
8.5  Conclusions
Our object has been to analyse household livelihood decision-making processes 
under the shadow of violence in the post-conflict CHT region of Bangladesh. As 
with other developing country internal conflicts, the accord ending the insurgency 
is imperfect in nature, and the central grievance concerning land encroachment is 
yet to be addressed. Violence between settlers who have encroached on the land of 
the ethnically distinct local population is still prevalent, and the Bangladesh army 
is still present in the region in substantial numbers to deal with any potential insur-
gency. Land, in the context of the densely populated and agriculturally dependent 
country, is the principal bone of contention. Thus, neo-Malthusian factors play a 
role in this conflict, as the shortage of land necessitates encroachment by settlers, 
which along with grievances induced by land grabbing and threats to the distinct 
way of life of the indigenous people produces conflict.
The main innovation of the analysis is the incorporation of psycho-social fac-
tors, specifically the trauma of past violence and also current perceptions of the 
likelihood of future conflict into the analysis of economic decision-making. We 
also include some information on trust between the different identities that make 
up the indigenous group in the region. In that sense, we endogenise preferences 
with regard to consumption, cropping and the decision to school children to these 
phenomena, in line with the tenets of current behavioural economics. Our research 
suggests that under certain circumstances, heightened subjective perceptions about 
violence reigniting in the future as well as past experiences of conflict may lower 
consumption expenditure as a risk-reducing tactic. The propensity to send children 
to school and engage in risky mixed crop cultivation may also increase with cer-
tain types of past experiences and future expectations of violence.
The endogenous determination of preferences is one aspect of the explanation 
for the phenomena we are observing. It cannot by itself adequately explain greater 
risk-taking. We go on to discover that certain types of risky behaviour are best 
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explained by prospect theory, which under certain circumstances predicts a  certain 
degree of risk-taking as a response to loss. While preferences may be endogenous 
to past experiences, current perceptions and social capital in the form of trust 
(behavioural economics), risk-taking can be better explained by prospect theory. 
Conflict (experienced or anticipated) may make some people bolder and more 
risk-taking in order to enhance their long-term future. Prospect theory is apposite 
in understanding this reaction, as people frame their decisions in the light of per-
sonal priorities that dominate the expected objective value of greater risk-taking.
Poverty and conflict are inextricably intertwined. The widespread presence 
of poverty enhances conflict risk; conflict equally inhibits poverty reduction; see 
Murshed (2010, Chaps. 2 and 3) for a literature review. Thus, it is important to 
diminish conflict risk in any strategy of poverty reduction, and conflict abatement 
also requires poverty reduction. An important policy consideration is, therefore, 
to reduce poverty in post-conflict settings, in particular; otherwise, conflict may 
reignite and poverty rise even further. A crucial corollary, at the local level, of this 
conclusion involves enhancing household-level economic activity immediately 
after the cessation of conflict. In addition to the standard poverty reduction pre-
scriptions involving service provision (health, education and social services), skill 
acquisition and access to credit, an important facet of post-conflict reconstruction 
and poverty reduction is enhancing trust and confidence. This is the main policy 
conclusion of our study.
An extensive review of the literature on livelihoods in fragile and conflict-
affected regions can be found in Malett and Slater (2012), suggesting a wide tax-
onomy of outcomes and mixed policy intervention success. Our results do suggest 
the possibility of a post-conflict Phoenix or rapid economic recovery factor at the 
household level in the CHT region of Bangladesh. Its presence or absence has a lot 
to do with individual household behaviour, and the manner in which past experi-
ences of violence and current perceptions about future conflict are processed in 
the mind. If it makes individuals bolder so they aim at recovering past losses, or 
local institutional settings induce a preference for greater investment, a Phoenix 
factor may ensue, and rapid growth may follow. In this connection, the presence 
or absence of positive social capital may assist in greater investment for the future 
and enhanced poverty reduction. In addition to the standard prescriptions for pov-
erty reduction, involving increased access to credit and skill acquisition and micro-
credit, our study demonstrates the salience of confidence building. Ultimately, 
much hinges on confidence. Here, local factors in decision-making are salient, but 
a lot will still depend on the macropolitical and economic framework for large-
scale recovery to take place.
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